

XxxPutnam, Meaning, Being first known, Indexicality, Being logically included, 8/
7/94 BIG

"Water" means "something moist, fluid, transparent, etc." or "This moist, fluid, transparent, etc. thing." The basis of indexicality is the logical inclusion of something or thing in all our concepts. We always mean a certain something or a certain thing, and that thing can differ on twin earth. So maybe P proves, or at least confirms, that being is first known and logically included. It seems that you can argue that, if P's theory of meaning is correct, then being is first known and logically included in all our concepts. And if it were not included in the way just described, would indexicality be true?

Putnam, Meaning, Reference, Universals as Sets, 8/ 1/94

What does Putnam do with: This is red; he is hungry; she is liberal or anemic. It is vegetable. Etc. Reference is not the issue, unless these meanings are reduced to sets of referred to individuals.

Meaning, Putnam, January 28, 1994

If meaning is extension, isn't meaning really the same thing as truth, since the extension of a term amounts to the things the term is true of? But P argues in MofM (the Davidson section) and in RandR (the disquotatation section) that truth presupposes meaning. Is meaning the possible extension of a term? Then, do we need "possible" worlds to explain this. What do I say about this at the end of "If Wittgenstein Had

Read Poinsot"?

Re translation of "Quasar", "beech", and "elm", etc. Note that we can know the genus without the species, but not vice versa.

Meaning, Putnam, Truth, the Mental, January 16, 1994

Start from the truth of sentences: caused by identity of the things that are diversely made objects by the words. So far there is no reference to psychological states; I am talking about truth, not awareness of truth. But why does a word objectify one thing or set of things and not another? What causes a noise to do this is what the noise is used for. The verb "used" may imply a reference to a mental state. But even if we say that what a predicate is used for is a "concept," we do not mean anything essentially mental by "concept." For example, "water" objectifies what it does because "water" is used for water; is that for which "water" is used something mental? Well, is water something mental? "Tree" is used for trees. Are trees something mental?

But what is it for "tree" to be used for trees? Does this mean it is used for the set of all trees? Then how can it be used for one tree? It can objectify trees because it is used for the word-function of "trees", which is what it is for something to be a tree. Calling this a concept does not make it something mental, unless to be a tree is to be something mental. The use of "word-function" was solely to avoid the apparent reduction to the mental implied by "concept."

But is what it is to be a tree an abstract entity? (P. in M of M.) It is not an entity at all. It is what it is to be a certain entity; and it is made object by another entity, a mental state.

P's arguments at most show that having the concept of tree is not sufficient to explain our awareness of truth, which requires awareness that trees are objectified

by "tree." P does not and cannot show that awareness of the word-function of "tree" is not a necessary condition for awareness of truth, because it is necessary condition for truth.

Sure, the person on twin earth can use the same word-function to objectify things that are not trees. But the fact that a psychological state of awareness of a word-function is still necessary is shown by P's own example of "here," or "this." When I and my twin use these words, the contents of our psychological states appear to be the same, except for one thing: the here and the this I am aware of are different individuals from those he is aware of. Further, I am aware that these are unique individuals, even though I cannot objectify what distinguishes them from their counterparts otherwise than by the use of other indexicals. The point is, our psychological states are necessary conditions for awareness of the truth of sentences using "this" and "here." And the similarity of those states does not prevent us from being in the state of awareness that these are distinct individuals; rather those similar states allow us to be aware that we are dealing with distinct individuals. They are necessary conditions for that latter awareness.

Even the Scholastics knew that having concepts was not sufficient for the framing of propositions whose truth could be assented to. So they added supposition. Supposition is a logical doctrine; but it requires a psychological state behind it, as Maritain explicitly pointed out as early as the 1920s. So whatever we think of the doctrine of supposition, the mental state of having a concept was recognized to be only a necessary condition for having propositions; and the other conditions were further mental states.

Referring, January 21, 1994

The way we objectify actual existences is not by "referring" but by judging -- something Geach denied.

Meaning, Putnam, January 14, 1994

If there is silicone life on twin earth, would "genitalia" mean the same thing? Absolutely, because it's functions would be considered more important than how those functions were accomplished.

What about death? If here death consists in the soul leaving the body and on twin earth it does not, "death" would still mean the same thing. And why are not "genitalia" and "death" natural kind terms (since P. includes actions among natural kind terms).

Meaning, Putnam, Judgment, self-consciousness, thing-object, January 8, 1994

What is the meaning of "The Meaning of Meaning"? P. teaches us at least two things, both of which count against his own conclusion that our mental state does not determine meaning. One thing he teaches is what he calls the division of linguistic labor. But that theory counts against his discussion of translation in response to Searle in Representation and reality. To see this, see my discussion of translation in Notes2, dated Jan. 4 of this year. I do not refer to the division of linguistic labor there, because I had not found it in P yet. But the assumptions I work under there are what P call the division of linguistic labor.

Another thing he teaches us is that the contents of our consciousness can be the same as our counterpart on twin earth, yet we can still "mean" (or is it "refer"?) different things. The answer to this is yes and no. Even though the content of my sensory awareness (not just conceptual, as his own examples show) can be the same on twin earth, I can know that I am related to a unique individual and use that awareness to make a unique allusion ("reference" in the broader sense) to this individual. And, contrary to P, is not this awareness part of my psychological state? Only this awareness comes about through judgment, metaphysical, ontologically analyzed judgments, based on concepts originally derived from sensation. So P's discussion

of indexicality requires psychological states, only it requires such states more broadly conceived than just the contents of conception or sensation.

There is still a paradox, but an ordinary phil one: in some sense, I and my twin have the same consciousness when we judge "This is a unique individual". But this just shows the distinction between thing and object and the fact, shown by Husserl and Maritain, that we are aware of more than the mere aspects by which a thing is objectified.

And the same analysis applies to my and my twin's self-awareness. In some way the contents are the same, but those contents put me in a position to judge that they make me aware of a unique person. Perhaps, the more that we are both aware of through the same contents is Maritain's subjectivity, subsistence. See John Crosby's UFL article in "Life and Learning", the UFL proceedings for 1993.

The bottom line is that my and my twin's identical conscious states do allow us each to know a different truth expressed by "This is ...". Because each of us is aware of what we are using "This" for and what we are using "This" for is a unique individual and we each know that it is a unique individual.

Formal systems, logic, Putnam, P of NC, Trinity, September 15, 1993

It is not whether the p of NC is in the language or in the metalanguage. It is not whether a language contains the corresponding formula. It is whether what the formula expresses, what the P of NC expresses, is obeyed by the sentences, any sentence, in any language.

The same with a formula for transitivity of identity and the Trinity.

Putnam, meaning, science, operational defs, September 15, 1993

In translating, sometimes we realize the truth of "They must be using 'X' the way our scientists use, e.g., "quasar." So we translate 'X' as 'quasar.' "That which our

scientists call 'quasar' " is the meaning. "Called 'quasar' by our scientists" is our means of objectifying that meaning. Being called quasar by our scientists does not enter into the thing we mean; it is just the means of objectifying the thing we mean. Because being called 'quasar' does not enter into the meaning, it need not enter into what we translate when we translate 'quasar' as 'X.'

Also, operational definitions define things by our means of objectifying the thing, the operations being means of objectifying things, but not the things objectified.

Putnam on meaning, July 25, 1993

Elms and beeches problem. The way to handle the problem of translating "what experts call 'beeches' in English" is to analyze a similar case where ambiguity as between "elm" and "beech" is not at issue. For there are many, many cases when all a person knows about X is that there is something that experts, or just others, refer to as "X". E.g., what scientiests call "pulsars." And often the person who has no more knowledge than this of what, e.g., "pulsars" means is a professional translator. This must happen very frequently. So there is no reason whatever analysis explains what the translator does in this case cannot apply to elms and beeches as well.

Putnam and Maritain, 2-26-93

There is an intrinsic relation between the shape on the retina, say the shape A, and the object seen. So when we imagine or remember that shape, why can't there be an instrinsic relation of the state of our brain to the previous state of the retina?

There should be nothing mysterious about that. The problem is that so far we have only got a connections between states of the brain and sensibly distinguishable features. And Carnap's failure showed that we can't construct the rest of our concepts out of concepts for sensibly distinguishable features and the concepts of logic (or set theory). But even if we could, are there brain states with intrinsic natural connections to concepts like those of sets, truths, members of sets, etc.?

In any case, we need more than empirical and logical concepts. We get that more from judging, e.g., that an instance of the shape A exists.

Instead of "Putnam and Classical Realism," do "Putnam and Maritain." Then you can use quotations about the "natural metaphysics of the human mind" regarding, e.g., fire, from both DK and from Formal Logic. Then you can collect several articles in a book like "M, the first post-modern," or "M post-modern or ultra-modern," or "M and the modern mind," etc., etc. It can include the two M and Wittgenstein papers, one of which can develop the nature of logic. It can include the M and Putnam paper and the Poincaré Wittgenstein paper.

It can also include the "M's views on the philosophy of nature" paper. Including it will give you the chance to correct what you say about empiricists making the necessary equivalent to the analytic. It will also give you the chance to correct or at least add to what you say about perinoetic knowledge.

And why shouldn't there be a mental state (one, at least) with an intrinsic relation to that which is logically included when we are aware that what has been objectified by "red," etc. is more than an object of awareness? That implicitly reflective awareness is certainly natural to the intrinsic makeup of the mind if anything is. For the makeup of the brain orients it to that implicitly reflective awareness as the goal of all its other operations and states! So when we come to realize that awareness of real existence is logically included in that awareness, we

are relating to something, the previous judgmental awareness, for which there is a brain state with an intrinsic relation, just as when we imagine or remember the shape A, we are relating to something for which there is a state of the nervous system, namely, the shape on the retina, with an intrinsic relation. And once we have the concept of existence, we can construct other concepts, both ontological concepts and those that simply presuppose ontological concepts in the background, i.e., presuppose them as logically included.

So the key is that there can be a mental state that constitutes, intrinsically, a judgment. So after you have explained a lot of other things in this article, you can bring up, for the first time, P's criticism of Searle about brain states having intrinsic relations to their objects.

And notice how much more relevant to the issue of mental states as related to linguistic behavior are P's arguments than Quine's. Q's are at best indirectly related, on the basis of many dubious assumptions, e.g., the assumption that the necessary truths used to pin down translations are somehow related to "meaning" in a mental sense in a way that empirical truths are not.

Logic, entailment, 3-14-93

The best place to start appears to be a discussion of entailment, but how get from there to characteristics of objects and objects? Perhaps the objects known in three propositions can be said to have relations of entailment only as objects of human knowledge. Entailment is not a relation between states of affairs outside of the mind (but one state of affairs's resulting from another's is something that holds outside of the mind; still that causal relation is not what we judge to hold when we judge that an entailment is valid: we judge a relation between truths). Is the fact that inference or entailment appears to be something that pertains to the objects of

cognition as such contradicted by the fact that computers can judge validity of certain proofs? First, entailment is not the same thing as validity of proof. And computers only go through the steps of a "formal" proof. But whether those steps are gone through by us or by a computer, in order for us to connect that process with what we know to be validity of inference, we have to be independently aware of what that relation is. Maybe Quine's presentation of Carroll's paradox shows this.

Maybe the computer example is a good one. The computer comes back with the marks "This inference is valid." We have to connect those marks with what we would mean by them? How do we know the connection between the computers marks and what we mean? We have to understand the steps in the program that the computer carried out. That is, we have to be aware of what the steps in the program are and of how the steps relate to logical principles whose necessary truth we are aware of.

The bottom line is that is being aware that x and y entail z , we are aware of the necessary truth of that assertion. (Also, maybe the absence of a decision procedure is relevant, i.e., the computer can carry out a decision procedure but cannot determine any other kind of logical relation.

C and D, and Math, 2-6-93

(and see immediately preceding note) Maybe the way I distinguish mathematical and philosophical abstraction in CR is only an effect of the real difference between them. Maybe I should ask what the necessary causes are of the kinds of knowledge we have in metaphysics and in math and look for essential differences among those causes. For example, an essential cause of phil knowledge is awareness of X as a

transcendental causal relation or, in other words, the necessary bearer or term of a causal relation. Math uses causal relations to diversely objectify quantitative relations, but quantitative relations are not necessary causal relations, nor do they enter math as such.

Xxx

Abortion, 3-7-93

Opening: At what stage in the infant's development does it become morally wrong for an adult to kill the infant? Or until what stage is it morally permissible for an adult to kill an infant? For brevity, I will speak of the stage at which it becomes wrong for the adult to kill the infant as the stage at which the infant acquires the right to life. But no more is meant by "acquiring the right to life" than its becoming morally wrong, for whatever the reason may be, for an adult to kill the infant.

Abort, 3-5-93 AA

You cannot separate the question of the extension of moral concepts from the question of the content of moral concepts. What we say about their content has necessary implications for their extension. And the only place from which content can come is the orientation to ends that exists prior to the choices that morality will evaluate.

Concerning Thomson and Davis's point that we instinctively consider it moral to save the mother rather than the fetus. Does this show a moral assymetry between the two? First, T's violinist example shows that the same instinctive preference can

occur when there is no assymetry, as there is in the case of the fetus. More importantly, no assymetry is needed in either case. The assumption is that only one can survive and that only one is conscious and capable of making a decision. As long as the action taken is otherwise moral, ie., that all other things are equal, there is nothing immoral in the one capable of making a decision preferring her own life to the life of the other. This is perfectly understandable. And the violinist example shows that it has nothing to do with the dependency or underdevelopment of the fetus.

But in the case of the fetus there are the additional factors or relationships that the mother has developed on which the happiness of others depends to a certain extent. The fetus, unlike the violinist, has no such relationships. So this is a somewhat moral reason for "preferring" the mother. At the least, it is a reason for our emotional preference for the mother.

Ethics, 3-2-93, Big at end

I can wish that I or another person die; I can want for myself or another person to be dead. I cannot morally will that a human being, myself or another, die as a result of an action of my chosen in knowledge of the fact that the person will die as a result of this action. E.g., if I remove a canerous uterus, I know the fetus will die; but I do not want it to die and am not choosing its death. I can want my own death, but cannot knowingly choose a course of action that will lead to that death. But I can sacrifice my life for another, but I do not will that my death occur as a result of my act of sacrifice. I do not will that there be a connection between my act of sacrifice and my death.

I cannot will to be the cause of death, the agent of death. If so, I am knowingly evaluating something to be other than what I know it to be. That is, I am treating something as if it were not what it is. But I am not treating something as

if it were not what it is, if I want to die; only if I want to be the cause of death. Only if I want to be that which deprives a human being of any further pursuit of ends. My nature is such as to be an orientation to the further pursuit of human ends. I can want that pursuit to stop; but if I want to be the cause of its stopping, I want to be other than what I am; I even want my rational appetite to be other than what it is.

I am treating a human agent as if that agent were not an end in itself, treating a human cause, a cause of human behavior, as if it were not an end in itself. I am treating a causal system oriented to pursuing human ends in a human way, as if it were not an end in itself. For I am cutting off its further pursuit of ends. Better, I am choosing to be the agent that cuts off the further pursuit of human ends, rather than be what I am, an agent the pursues human ends, an agent that is what it is for the sake of being in pursuit of human ends.

When I evaluate, I do not just evaluate features or actions. I evaluate what the underlying being is. It is the underlying being that is an end in itself. And if I will to be the agent of that underlying being's death, I am willing that the underlying being be the agent of the cessation of an end in itself.

Abortion, 2-28-93

Instead of the zygote having rights if the adult does, perhaps you can say the zygote has ethical value, if the adult does; or if an adult has ethical value, a zygote does; or whatever ethical value an adult has, a zygote has. Or if the ethical value of an innocent adult is such that it is wrong to kill the adult, the ethical value of a zygote is such that it is wrong to kill the zygote. At least, you can bring this way of putting it (the latter one) in later as a replacement for "rights" talk, thus kicking away the ladder after climbing up it.

Ethics, suicide, value of life, 2-28-93

The bottom line: I evaluate myself and other human beings as agents, as oriented to actions for the sake of achieving human ends. If I chose to kill myself or another, I evaluate myself to be the opposite kind of agent. What I am in my evaluations is the opposite kind of agent; what my evaluations make of me, what I make of myself in my evaluations, is the opposite of that kind of agent. I or the other whom I choose to kill is also no longer an end-in-itself in my evaluations. For my or its being an end-in-itself does not consist in our making free choices of any end whatsoever, it consists in being the underlying agent of a nature that pursues the ends it has prior to choice by making free choices; and those free choices can contradict the ends it has prior to choice and so contradict its being an agent of a certain kind prior to choice.

Also, the only non-arbitrary standard for value is the orientation to ends that exists prior to choice. A choice that actively frustrates that orientation to ends, that puts that orientation to ends out of existence, cannot be a valid choice by its own nature. One of those prevolitional ends, but only one of them, is the orientation to pursue other ends by making free choices. The fact that this is only one end means that the fact that the choice of suicide or murder is a free choice does not imply that this is a valid choice that a third party, for instance, must respect, or a choice that gives a third party the right to assist in.

The opponent will say that the only prevolitional orientation to ends that matters is the generalized orientation to universal good that makes free choice possible. But choices are always made in view of the achievement of the ends of powers other than the will. And even that generalized orientation is sufficient to make it invalid to evaluate ourselves as agents oriented to the cessation of existence of that generalized orientaton to ends.

Abort, 1-31-93

If mature human characteristics "give value" to human beings, then human zygotes and embryos give value to themselves, give their own value to themselves, produce their own value. And by aborting them, we are preventing them from producing their own value, from giving their own value to themselves. Our "selves" are preventing their "selves" from giving themselves value. We have no more right to prevent them from giving themselves value than we have to prevent a mature human being from actively pursuing some future end she deems will bestow additional value on her.

Abortion, 1-5-93

The opponent may require that the agent perform some specifically personal act in order to acquire value; the personal act or characteristic would bestow value. This assumes the agent is not a person to begin with; an unjustified assumption; also, why is not the reproduction of specifically personal genes a personal act? By what criterion is that reproduction not the right kind of personal act?

Also, even more basically, by what criterion can one demand anything specifically human or specifically personal? Only by the criterion of specifically human or personal ends, i.e., only on the basis of an orientation to specifically human or personal ends. Such an orientation is the only thing that will bestow value on the use of such a criterion.

ethics, 12-13-92

Does the domain of ethics solely concern the harm or good we do to others? If physical harm done to another is unintentional, it has no ethical character. It only becomes ethical to the extent that it is willed on the basis of rational knowledge. So the good or evil that is specifically ethical is the interior good or evil of the rational decision, not the external physical good. The opponent will respond that

ethical good or evil consists of the combination of an interior decision with an effect on another person. So, the opponent would say, a deliberate misevaluation of something that does not hurt another, say, worshipping a stone, has no ethical implications.

xxxEpistemology, Self-consciousness, Jesse, Conformity with the nature of the mind,
June 1, 1994

Is reason just a blind instinct? What do we mean by "reason"? Acts of knowing truths caused by awareness of sufficient evidence occur. We happen to discover the existence of such acts in reflection. That which we discover, we call "reason." Reason is not a blind instinct but the power by which we know truths.

Notice that we not only discover the existence of acts of knowledge on reflection, we discover the existence of the power for performing such acts. This is because "by reflection" means that we do not just find those acts in our field of experience, but we find those acts emanating from a source we call "I". Emanating from the same source that the reflection emanates from, because that is what reflection is.

Consciousness, self-consciousness, and Poincaré, 3-17-93

In primary awareness, eg., in vision, I do not know in advance what the object will be. E.g., if my eyes are closed, I do not know what I will see when I open them. In reflective consciousness there are no such surprises (there may be surprises, but not that kind); I already know what I will "see". Or I already knew that which I am now aware of reflectively, and there was never room for doubt about what it was that I would be aware of reflectively.

Empasize that, contrary to appearances, his theory of truth is independent of the subject/predicate sentence scheme, as well as of the substance, accident ontology. It is even independent of the distinction between sentences and propositions, as long as we are aware of what the words in the sentence mean. Likewise, pace Prior, it is independent of there being something we can call "What the sentence say" as opposed to "How we say things are". For truth, there must be identity between how we say things are, or how a sentence says things are, and how things exist, or what really exists. "Things must be as the sentence says they are" means "there must be identity between the way things exist and the way the sentence says they exist.

Putnam, 4-20-93

On meaning: Knowledge of nature is causal knowledge, knowledge of X as the source of effects. An elm is a tree where the source of the phenomena is a source of the same kind (kind=nature) as these trees that I have seen, rather than the source of the kind of individuals called "beeches" elsewhere.

This has implications for ethics. In abortion article, I talk about ends of the the same "kind"; "kind" = "nature," and "nature" underlying cause, or underlying causal structure, or underlying causal dispostions.

And for a blind person, "red" might mean "the color of bullfighter's capes." What does "quantum gravity" mean to me? There might be a Frenchman for whom "x,y,z" means what "quantum gravity" means to me, except for the words. There are contexts where the appropriate translation of "quantum gravity" as used by me would express the fact that I only know there is something for which others use those marks; and the French translation could use "x,y,z" instead.

I have a kind of lexicological knowledge of meaning in the case of "quantum gravity" but no nonlexicological knowledge. That disinction is important in dealing with this problem of Putnam's. In translation, I am often interested in the

nonlexicological object pointed to by the lexicological knowledge that, say, "quantum gravity" has a use, the nonlexicological object pointed to by the lexicological description "that which 'quantum gravity' means." And I should translate accordingly, ignoring the differences between the corresponding lexicological descriptions in the two languages.

Putnam says that the realist/idealist distinction makes no real difference. But Maritain has a realist metaphysics and epistemology that precisely justifies a holistic approach to scientific truth. (So maybe title it P and M, or P and M's Classical Realism, or P and M: Internal Realism or Classical Realism? At end, change from "classical" realism to "diacritical or teleonomic" realism.

Also, see the marginal notes in the commentaries on the Tractatus for points on P and and on analytic philosophy in general, including some good quotes from P.

Putnam, 3-12-93

In the Philosophical Investigations, #20, Wittgenstein asks us to consider two languages, in one of which the single word "slab" does the work done in the other by the for words "Bring me a slab." He asks whether different things are going on in peoples' heads when they use these sentences in the same sense. Now in one way, there is obviously something diferent going on in their heads; they are mentally related to very different physical signs. At the same time, they are related to the same sense in the single act of being related to those physical signs as signs. The question is, could the relation to the same sense by the only thing in common to what is going on "in their heads." Why not? One group of people learn to be related to that sense in the act of being related to a long physiscal sign; the other group of people learn to be related to that sense in the act of being related to a short physical sign.

Could the physical causes on the intentional relation to the sense be different in each case? Why not? Different causes can have the same effect. Laughter can be caused by telling a joke or by tickling. Is it possible that the only unity of the two is one of abstraction; we abstract from each the common relation to the sense, but everything other than the intentional relation to the sense is different? Again, the only thing excluded is that everything physical be the same and the intentional relation be to a different sense.

If two languages use the same sound, "ga," for different senses, we know the physical state of the mind will be different. Words are first associated with sensibly distinguishable features that have different states of the nervous system associated with them. Terms that are logically included, such as ontological terms, come from the act of judgment, which may have many different objects and so many different physical states.

Putnam, 1-23-93

Title: "Putnam and Classical Realism." Use P's reference to "since the 17th century to justify the reference to "classical." Send to Review of Meta and ask Jude, after it is accepted, if I can revise it based on P's own input.

State that it can appear that the burden of proof is fully on the person who claims there are ontological, regulative, necessary truths. In one sense, the burden of proof is there, and I fully accept it (even if other classical realists shun it). But in another sense, it is enough to hypothesize that change needs a cause. What makes this sufficient is that we can give a cash value to that hypothesis: it amounts to the hypothesis that change is a relation of dependence (as in the disposition is not distinct from the ground).

Relate classical realism to the 4 points of internal realism that P gave in class. Especially point out that there is more than one way for thoughts to conform to reality and that there need by neither a fixed number of "objects" or a fixed "kind" of object. Ontologically there are substance and accident, but we may not, and probably do not, know how many. And the ontological cut does not tell us how to take the empiriological cut. And even ontologically, there are different cuts in the sense that there is also the cut between causes and effects, created and uncreated, infinite and finite, material and immaterial, knowing and nonknowing, one and many, etc., etc. There are also degrees of knowledge, etc.

This title, by being broader than "The Meaning of 'The Meaning of Meaning'," (which could be a subtitle within the whole) could even give you a chance to talk about logic, i.e., in addition to the sacrilization of logic (which has always been around) there is a sacrilization of a tool of logic.

In conversation, P said words to the effect that, although there is much more to say about existence, nothing that we will add will contradict the statement that the function of "exists" is logical. I say it is, and can be, no more logical than "red," "round," "two-legged," etc. But what is at stake in saying that the function of exists is not logical? What is the cash value of saying that?

What is at stake is achieving the goal of philosophy and of epistemology in particular. Epistemology evaluates, states what goal is achieved by theories, states of consciousness, sentences, names, inductions, etc. To understand the goal of language and awareness, we need to see that we use "exists" for a non-logical value? What value? For the causal condition that enables things to be the cause of the truth of our sentences, the causal condition that constitutes the goal of our use of sentences. This is not a definition of "exists," because to define "cause" I would have to use "exists." But it is a true statement about "exists." Since knowledge

of what exists is the goal of awareness and language, to evaluate awareness and language, we need to recognize and use the non-logical sense of "exists."

The alternative is to evaluate success in terms of sensibly distinguishable characteristics, whether understood as attributes of experience or of physical things. But sensible distinguishable characteristics are the means by which we become aware of what exists and of the natures of what exists. To evaluate in terms of them rather than in terms of the goal of knowing what exists is to measure success in terms of the means, not the end. The reason they are only means and not ends is that in their state as objects of sense experience, as opposed to their state as objects of imagination, sensible characteristics are known as characteristics of the action of the environment on us. Because we are aware of them as the action of the environment on us, we are non-inferentially aware of the existence of the environment acting on us in the same state of awareness.

The objection that hallucinations appear to be as really existing as do the objects of genuine perceptions bring up another equally important reason why we need to know that the value for which we use "exists" is nonlogical. We need to use inductive reasoning to distinguish genuine perceptions from hallucinations. To understand both how inductive is rationally justifiable and why the use of inductive reasoning does not lead to an inferential theory of perception, we need to know necessarily true causal principles. Knowing the necessary truth of those principles requires the use of "exists" for the value by which objects of genuine perceptions, as opposed to objects of mere imagination, hallucination, or conception, from merely being objects of that form of consciousness.

In Representation and Reality, P says Rorty gives up reference. Not really. So that statement of P's can be used as an entree for a discussion minimizing the importance of "reference" but not of extension, which Rorty certainly does not deny. Other statements of P's provide openings. The first chapter of RWHF says Kant first

posed phil questions as they should be posed. Well, classical realism has answers to those questions that have not been tried, even though classical realism did not start off by asking its questions in the same way. The laziness of Thomists explains why classical realism's answers are not better known. Also, in either "Meaning Holism" or Representation and Reality, and perhaps in both places, P explicitly says he is talking about the theory of mental representations we have received from the 17th century!

Use the quote about Kant being the first to properly formulate the questions as an excuse to bring in the common assumption of rationalism and empiricism, which P may not have looked at in that way; for K's question arises, ultimately, from that common assumption.

I do not know whether the universe is one substance. But I am aware of models of arguments which, if valid, would show, for instance, that each human being is a substance. Is the existence of such models sufficient to found the concept of truth? It should be. What if I am convinced for a long time by a proof that each human being is a substance? Then, I at least believe that the assertion that each human being is a substance is either true or false. But now, what if I find a flaw in the proof. Does "each human being is a substance" cease being either true or false? At that rate, nothing would become true until someone knows that it is true. But don't make a big deal out of the anti-realist concept of truth; not that much of what you need to say hangs on it. Draw the battle line elsewhere.

Truth and Tarski and Limits of Formal Systems, 1-22-93

Tarski' definition of truth cannot possibly be useful in understanding truth for ordinary sentences. Tarski's account depends on his "Criterion of Adequacy" (see Representation and Reality, p. 67). That criterion makes the claim that certain sentences are provable in the metalanguage. Therefore, the metalanguage has to be

defined rigorously; otherwise, there would be no useful notion of proof in the metalanguage. So three languages are involved. We start with ordinary language and define the metalanguage sufficiently to support the notion of proof and sufficiently for the metalanguage to define the language. But the concept of truth for ordinary sentences does not come into existence at a level removed from those sentences. And it could not come into existence at a level removed from those sentences. Any higher level we might construct, we would construct on the basis of the first level. Whether or not sentences on the first level are actually true, we would need to already have the idea of truth, and beliefs about truth, at that first level.

What Putnam shows in Representation and Reality is that Tarskian definitions cannot capture the notion of truth in natural languages, i.e., that p is true according to what p means in L. (And what does Tarski say about sentences with double meanings in L?

Reference, 1-20-93

If the "reference" of a word means its extension, then the function of intentional existence is not to provide a reference for a term. The function of intentional existence is not to provide a reference for "unicorn." On the contrary, "unicorn" has no extension, and what exists intentionally when we know the meaning of "unicorn" is something with no extension. So it exists intentionally in spite of its having no extension.

Truth, 1-19-93

"This sentence is true" cannot be true for the same reason that "this sentence is equiangular" cannot be true. For something to be eligible for the predicate "true" certain conditions must be met. Truth is an effect of certain conditions. In "this sentence is" those conditions have not been met yet, so truth cannot belong to it yet.

Adding the word "truth" does not meet those conditions, so the sentence cannot be true. Adding the word "false" does not meet those conditions either, but that would not prevent the sentence from being false. The sentence does not have the conditions necessary for falsehood; therefore it is false to say the sentence is false. But the latter contradiction does not make the sentence true; it is false because it lacks the necessary conditions for either truth or falsity. "This sentence is false" is not true in the same way "this sentence is left-handed" is not true; both sentences are false in the same way.

There are psychological concepts and objective concepts. What is the objective "proposition" like? Well, what is it that we can say yes or no to, assent to or dissent from? Some object that says things are such and such. The concept blue ball does not say any ball is blue. We assent to or dissent from an object that makes the claim that a ball is blue, a term of awareness that makes a claim about what is not a term of awareness. How does it make that claim? By being an identification in the mind of distinct objects. Since they are distinct as objects and are known to be distinct as objects, the identification in the mind does not refer to their status as objects but to some other state. Hence the identification makes a claim about these objects as more than objects, makes a claim about their identity as things.

Putnam, 1-8-93

Title: "The Meaning of 'The Meaning of Meaning'." Instead of "mental representation" he should say "intentional object." And notice that intentional objects include both the formal and material objects. He seems to be saying that the two planets have the same formal objects but different material objects. And notice that while "the conductor of this bus" can extend to more than one individual, "this bus" does not, i.e., this bus at this point in space-time. If the buses being at this point in space

time, or some other individuating condition, is objectified when this bus is my object, the two planets do not have the same intentional object.

An interesting test would be to have people from both planets unknowingly moved to a neutral planet where both kinds of water we found. And what do we do on earth, when we encounter tribes that do not have our kind of X but do have a species of X or, at least, some substance with similar phenomenal characteristics to X?

Also, is it temerity to predict that science will not force us to revise the laws of logic? To claim that the laws of logic are revisable is to claim that negation will cease to be negation. Is it temerity to predict that negation will not cease to be negation? That mass times velolcity will not cease to be mass times velocity?

Also, is it really true that we would say twin water wasn't water? When someone first hears that whales and dolphins are fish, don't they protest? And then don't they ask, "Well, what do you mean by 'fish?'" And children laugh wwhen we tell them that they are really animals. Also, we call spiders insects and ask for a definition when told they are not. Also, we think peanuts are nuts; we are surprised to find that stars are really other suns; that such and such isn't a star but a galaxy; that penguins are birds; etc.

Also, a virus isn't really alive; that bacterium is not really a protazoan, since it doesn't have a membrane. Whales and dolphins are not really fish.

Re "fish": When I find out that those who know more about what things are than I do know that whales are mammals, not fish, I also find out that what they are using "fish" for is more detailed than what I am using fish for. I may find out that the word-function for which everyone else in the society uses "fish" is more detailed than the word-function I thought they were using "fish" for. But since I have an idea of what mammals are (which before this time I need not have thought contradicted the idea of fish, i.e., up to now some mammals could have satisfied my idea of fish), I can

restrict my use of "fish" to those things the society calls fish without learning the further details the society has in its word-function for fish. Does my word-function for fish now include a reference to the noise "fish"? I.e., does my word-function now include a reference to that for which others in the society use the noise "fish"?

What would it mean if it did? I would be objectifying their word-function for fish (which does not include a reference to the noise "fish") the way a translator does. A translator starts off not knowing what we use "fish" for but believing there is some word-function for which we use the noise "fish." A translator is objectifying the word-function of "fish" by an external causal relation of which that word-function is the term, a contingent causal relation that does not reveal any more of the nature of the term than that it can be the term of such a relation. The translator and I have object-descriptions of the word-function of a thing-description, and we do not confuse the word-function of the object-description with the word-function of the thing-description. And everyone in the society could make use of such object-descriptions for knowing how to use every term in the language, without its following that translations should include the object-description in the word-function of the translation. (Reply to Putnam's reply to Searle in Representation and Reality. Note that all I have to say is that it does not follow that the translation should include . . .)

When I learn that whales are not fish, I learn that I have been using a word incorrectly, where correctness is judged by how (certain) others use the word. In this vanilla situation, what is there that argues against a mental state of awareness of meaning? Nothing. Then what is there that argues against such a mental state when a traveller to Twin Earth finds that he has been using "water" otherwise than the natives have? P would reply that what argues against it is that their mental states are the same, whereas my mental state re "fish" is not the same as the experts. But consider the mental state(s) of the first person who learned that whales' underlying

biological causal structure, i.e., reproductive structure, was more like a horse's than a trout's? Until that time, he had the same intentional object for "fish" that we had, i.e., something that lives underwater. And so "fish" for him referred to whales, just as "water" refers to the same thing(s) on earth and twin earth.

So maybe the way to proceed is to see what goes into learning that I am using "fish" incorrectly, or into learning that we should restrict the use of the word "fish." And after establishing that, compare step-by-step with progressively more complex Twin Earth examples.

And very importantly, note that P's arguments do not disprove, in fact they assume, the existence of intentional objects. For example, some of them rely on the fact that the intentional objects would be the same on Twin Earth. But the scholastic theory of mental entities is basically meant to explain our awareness of intentional objects. P's arguments are directed against specific theses concerning intentional objects and sign behavior that are peripheral, at most, to the scholastic theory. For example, meaning in the mental sense is not what is at stake in analyticity; nor were the scholastics necessarily thinking about synonymy or translation, certainly not primarily. As for intention and extension, P's arguments do not even contradict the principle that they are inversely proportional to one another. His arguments only claim to show that intention is not sufficient to determine extension.

Also, P says that reference is a social phenomenon and that we rely on others, experts, to determine correctness of reference. But this requires my awareness of social realities, e.g., the existence and nature of experts. This awareness is itself intellectual and is either linguistic or pre-linguistic, i.e., is the kind of awareness the use of predicates presupposes. So that awareness requires me to have natures and other universals as intentional objects. So I still need psychological entities to explain my cognitional relation to these objects. This is not a chicken-before-egg argument. It is true, as P would no doubt say, that there is no privileged

set of primary objects of this awareness, primary objects my awareness of which is presupposed by my awareness of what predicates refer to. Its just to say that P's arguments, e.g., the social nature of reference, do not eliminate the need for mental entities as causes of the awareness of objects the social nature of reference requires.

And the same cause cannot have different effects. Different psychological states can relate us to the same intentional object, but can the same psychological state in two different people relate them to different intentional objects? The psychological state (the total state, a complex of many dispositions and factors) by which I am related to what I know about the thing I call "water" cannot relate me to another intentional object. P might agree but reply that the cause of my referring to water is not just that psychological state but social realities of which I am aware. But my awareness of those social realities requires psychological states. Can all the relevant psychological realities of two people be the same and yet have different effects, the effects of referring to two different substances by "water"? P says part of the causality is the environment, the nature of things in the environment, whether I am aware of the difference of those natures or not (e.g., water and twin water). I can make P's point consistent with mine by noting that logically included in my intentional object for "water" is the logically vague object: something whose nature causes these characteristics I associate with water. That logical inclusion and that vagueness, together with the facts that (Husserl) objects are always presented as more than objects and that logical relations like inclusion are transparent, i.e., terminate in what is more than an object, makes P's position consistent with mine.

Concerning P's statement that we "would not say" Twin water was water, i.e., that "water" refers to both. As a matter of fact, we do resist and protest when we are told that our usage does not conform to that of experts. I resisted when told

peanuts were not nuts. Think of "commonly but inaccurately called 'tars'." If you want to call them 'tars', what's wrong with that? Later, but only later on reflection, I realized "there must be a good reason."

In saying against Searle (HWAHF) that mental states are not intrinsically related to certain objects, is P seriously saying that someday we will not be able to examine the state of a person's brain and know what he is thinking of? I should not accuse P of implying that until I am sure. But someday science will be able to do that, and what else would Searle want to mean by mental states being intrinsically related to certain objects (maybe ask Dennett about this)? And why should this be surprising. Is it surprising that evolution selected the brain precisely for the ability of states of the brain to relate us to what things are. Would not those kinds of brains whose states did not relate us to specific objects have been deselected? And if Quine can argue from Darwin, why can't I?

In the case of elms and beeches, we can look at the brain and say this person has the intentional object common to elms and beeches. If the person knows that elms are not beeches, he must use more of his knowledge, more than that common intentional object, when distinguishing between them. And whatever that additional knowledge amounts to, we should be able to look in his brain and find states relating him specifically to that additional knowledge.

The only problem left is the Twin Earth problem, where the intentional objects are the same and there apparently is no additional knowledge by which to distinguish the intentional objects. (Reread that NYT article on cups.) If P is correct that we would say TE "water" refers to something different from our water, it is because of what is logically included in both intentional objects, namely, whatever has the nature that grounds this behavior in these cases. Without that logical inclusion, the environment cannot enter into determining reference.

So the meaning of "The Meaning of Meaning" is that it forces us to enrich our

idea of logical inclusion, but it does so in a way that adds to what we know about it without contradicting anything essential that we know about it.

Logical inclusion can help P by explaining how the environment can help fix reference.

Indeterminacy of translation, 1-8-93

Notice that the reply to Quine is strictly behavioral. Behavioral evidence shows how the "apparatus of individuation" is being used. So what have Quine's arguments got to do with the "mental" in the sense of something interior. Quine too hastily equates "meaning" with the "mental."

Concerning existence. When I said Frege makes to exist to be known, Putman understood "knowledge" in the sense of certitude of truth; his example was that there might exist something at the center of a black hole. If so the predicate has an application whether or not we know it. My reply. I do not mean Frege makes to exist to be relative our justified certitude of truth. He makes to exist relative to human constructs, predications, whether or not we know the truth of those constructs. Putnam mentioned Russell as a counterexample to my claim that the Fregean approach makes to be to be known. But Russell somewhere says that the concept of existence is derived from that of truth. But truth is a property of statements, human constructs. So Russell makes to exist to be relative to statements, human constructs. This brings me back to Jesse Yoder's point about whether it was true in the past that dinosaurs existed (when there were no humans to construct statements about them). My reply. At the time of the dinosaurs, did there exist a truth that dinosaurs existed? No. So if that is what you mean by "Was it true that . . ." the answer is no. And if that is not what you mean, then you must mean "Is it now true that there

were dinosaurs; is the sentence that we now have, 'There were dinosaurs' true?"

But how can past existence be the cause of present truth? Not as efficient cause, but as final cause and, perhaps, as extrinsic formal cause in its present intentional existence.

Don't start off the discussion with the question of existence. Start with analyticity and necessity. Explain necessity by logical relations, which do not require insights into reality. Then go to causal necessity. After the demonstration, introduce the notion of ontological truth with reference to that existence which is defined as other than being "known," not in the sense of justified certitude, but in the sense of the term of a cognitional relation. A point to emphasize is that causally necessary ontological truths give grounds for deciding between frameworks that do not impose any frameworks in advance.

Also explain that science can be simpler than reality, and that the lack of complete commensurability between mathematical and physical relations can explain anomalies like quantum physics.

P will reply to my point that the foundations of empirical knowledge provide a means of deciding between frameworks that it cannot decide whether numbers are sets of sets or functions, whether points are defined as the center of concentric circles or as limits. I do not claim the foundations of empirical knowledge can settle all questions. Also, questions about mathematically abstracted objects do not concern physical existence. If and when math objects are related to questions about physical existence, the math objects must be viewed as properties of putative causes, necessary properties, of putative causes of experienced things. If two math theories handle those properties equally well, the math theories, or the differences between them, do not have physical content to that extent.

After reading Putnam on meaning, e.g., twin earth and elms/beeches problem. Why couldn't a tribe refer to both elms and beeches by one word, e.g., "oak"? Then when a scientific biologist tells them those are really two different kinds of tree, they say, Oh, there are two different kinds of oak. The biologist says, No, they are not species of the same genus. But he is just defining the genus differently; he is not taking the sense-perceivable similarities between elms and beeches to define the genus. And all that amounts to is saying it is better to take the underlying causal structure, rather than the phenomenal characteristics, as defining the genus; but there is nothing to say you can't take the phenomenal characteristics as defining a generic term. Still, the phenomenal characteristics are slippery, changeable from person to person, hard to describe with precision, etc., etc. Those are all reasons for not using the phenomenal characteristics to define a generic term; it is not very useful to do so. But no issue of truth about elms and beeches and, more importantly, about the mental entities that allow us to use words meaningfully, enter in.

Also, we often use the same term both generically and for one of the species that fall under the genus. E.g., we say "animal" of both men and animals, but we also distinguish the two by saying nonhumans are just animals. What is the difference between this and paragenic predication? The answer to that question will help us understand the difference between paragenic differences and specific differences.

Another example, a tribe might use "table" for three-legged things, never having seen four-or-more-legged things. Their decision as to whether to continue using "table" for 3-legged things has nothing to do with the issue of mentalism; nor does "decision" in this context have to be an explicit mental act.

xxxSensation, rational belief, punctiform phenomenalism, May 29, 1994 BIG

Count two or more temporally discrete objects, e.g., sounds or objects of touch. Only

the latest step in the series has actual existence. But we can know that our count is correct, because the series is part of the temporal continuum that makes up our present experiences, and all present experiences are continua of which only that terminus has actual existence at anyone time. But such termina do not have independent existence, i.e., do not exist independently of their function as being mere termina of continua of existence. Otherwise, these termina would really be parts, and the finite would be composed of infinitesimals. So by the fact of the existence of moments, we know that continua must have existed.

Later we can have warranted belief that, earlier, we had knowledge of the correct count. And we can have knowledge that this belief is the only reasonable belief, i.e., that it is not reasonable to believe the opposite.

What about counting items all of which exist in the present, e.g., visual objects? The acts of counting form a continuous series, but does our certitude of the correctness of the count depend on the continued present existence of all the objects counted?

Start the answer to the punctiform phenomenalist here, at the intellectual level, not at the sense level. Then go to the sense level where we can "know" at a given time that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of the proposition that I am now in contact with extramental existence.

xxxLogic, entailment example, March 20, 1994

The only error possible is a failure of memory, because what we have to understand to grasp the truth are our own constructs. At the time, you know, you have knowledge. And later it can be pathological to think you were wrong then, pathological because unreasonable causally: it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of "I had logical knowledge then." What makes it unreasonable is what makes it unreasonable to believe

that water only freezes in rooms with blue walls, etc., i.e., we would have to postulate more processes implying more causes than we have evidence for, or fewer than we have evidence for.

Probability and induction, 3-7-93

"The odds against B's always following A's in these cases or these samples are 100,000 to 1; so we know there is a causal connection. Here the degree of probability of our induction is known exactly. But how do I know what the odds are? By application of knowledge gained from previous inductions? So induction is more primitive than probability.

XxxOntological Analysis, Dianoetic/Perinoetic knowledge, September 21, 1993

From an analysis (ontological analysis) of what the accident rationality is, we learn that between beings that do and do not have that accident, there is a difference of substantial form, since that accident comes from the substantial form, not from some external agent. We also learn properties of the form itself, e.g., it is immaterial, subsistent, immortal, and has freedom of choice. From an analysis (ontological) of intellect and will, we learn they are different accidents and that the speculative and practical intellects are not different accidents. From an analysis of . . . , we learn that art and prudence are distinct accidents, etc. So ontological analysis is more basic, a more basis distinction, than dianoetic/perinoetic.

Ontological analysis, July 18, 1993

There is a common reference to being in all our concepts. All our concepts include a common reference to being. Being is included in all our concepts in a common way. Ontological concepts start from that common reference and go beyond it to construct references to being that are not common to all concepts.

ontological analysis, 12-11-92

there is an ontological element in all word-functions, so how can you distinguish sciences as ontological and nonontological. And how can you argue from the ontological character of word-functions to the necessary appearance of contradictions in philosophy? The issue is how a sciences definitions distinguish things from one another, since, by hypothesis, all word-functions are ontological when you get back to their common elements. The distinguishing features of definitions, for instance, what distinguishes red from green, logically contain ontological word-functions, since all word-functions logically contain ontological word-functions. But ontological values enter what distinguishes red from green only in the same way they enter what red and green have in common; they play no role in distinguishing red from green that they do not play in expressing what is the same about red and green. That is not true, the opposite is true, of ontological definitions; that is what makes ontological definitions ontological. And so apparent contradictions due to ontological word-functions arise only when we get back to the most common level, that is, the most fundamental level. For what makes it most common is that it is most fundamental (and vice versa?). But that is the territory of philosophy, by definition. So the apparent contradictions arise in the philosophical presuppositions of nonontological sciences, not in the nonontological sciences themselves.

XxxPoinot/Wittgentstein article, September 21, 1993

Part of the problem of carrying on the series is, in addition to the fact that adding two is a universal concept, the problem of knowing that that concept is indeed the concept the speaker intends by his order. However, this is just an empirical induction.

Universals, Sets, Logic, 6-18-93

Explaining universals by set membership is circular, because we have to use universals to define the members of sets. E.g., every person in this room. Even "in this room" relies on the universal term "room."

Universals, sets, meaning, Putnam, Poinot, etc., 6-13-93

Can "red" mean any color falling into a certain range of color? Isn't this the same as saying "red" means membership in a set of colors? No, a continuum is not a set; it is a potential set. "Red" means belonging to this range. The range is an individual, belonging-to-this-range is a universal. Still the range is objectified so as to be vague; it is objectified abstractly and vaguely.

Poinot, 3-23-93 -- AA

Maybe bring in the argument against sets being based on "similarity" from the problem of future members of sets. E.g., if "red" means a member of the set of red things, then that set can change in the future if our similarity perceptions change. The current meaning of "red" does not determine the truth of "The lips of future human babies will be red." Maybe put this in a footnote.

Other changes: "genetalia" footnote; response to Richard McDonough's "meaning loci" in the Tractatus.

Poinot, 3-17-93

Richard McDonough, The Argument of the Tractatus, introduces the concept of a "meaning locus" as an entity such that "acquaintance with it" reveals its meaning. Make sure the formulas you use to introduce concepts in the psychological sense and formal signs leave no room for that interpretation. See the marginal notes in McDonough, especially those on p. 183, but also elsewhere in McDonough, and other commentaries also.

McDonough says that it is acquaintance with the meaning locus that reveals its meaning. (Notice the epistemological fallacy: it is not the existence of the meaning locus that reveals its meaning; it is awareness of the meaning locus that reveals its meaning. That is, the meaning locus has the function of providing an epistemological ground, self-justifying evidence, not a causal ground.) But we already know what acquaintance with the meaning locus will reveal, because that acquaintance is reflective acquaintance on a prior acquaintance relation. It is the fact that we already know what acquaintance with the meaning locus will reveal that creates the illusion that acquaintance with it gives us some privileged access to meaning, in some unexplainable and unacceptable metaphysical sense.

xxxIntentionality, abstraction, images, jesse yoder, September 21, 1993

What makes the abstract image an image of Mr. Smith and no other human being? Since the image can't capture all the features of an individual (and thus is abstract), can't it be the image of more than one individual? Perhaps, just as a cartoon figure can resemble many individuals. But that is not what the abstraction of a concept is. The "genetalia" and other examples in the Poinset art show this (find the other examples by searching for "picture"). An abstract image of a man does not apply to many, even most, human beings. The concept of human being is something radically different from an abstract image.

Wittgenstein and Maritain, 4-20-93 AA

W is saying that it is only an illusion of our language games that the expectation contains what is expected. Because we use constructions like "I am waiting for him" to "describe" our behavior, it seems as if there must be a mental relation called "waiting" which is magically directed at "him."

XxxShort book, C and D, empiricism, July 25, 1993, BIG

The correct kind of empiricism is genetic empiricism, i.e., the correct theory of the psychogenesis of our concepts and beliefs that they derive from sense experience. The bad kind of empiricism, and a kind not justified by genetic empiricism, is terminal empiricism or methodological empiricism, or metaphysical empiricism. So all this stuff about "radical" empiricism or "true" empiricism is beside the point and concedes what it ought to be denying.

C and D, Short Book, July 11, 1993

Burton Dreben says "Watch out for the places where a philosopher says that such and such must be the case." I say "Watch out when a philosopher says (A) that an opponent's move invokes a notion, e.g., simplicity or double effect, that is fraught with difficulties, that is a quagmire." As opposed to what other philosophical notions that are not fraught with difficulties? The opponent replies (B) that, on the contrary, some notions are almost universally accepted among today's philosophers. I say watch out when a philosopher says (B). The next generation of philosophers will distinguish themselves from us precisely by overthrowing some of the very notions today's philosopher says are not quagmires, and tomorrow's philosopher will accomplish his overthrow by showing them to be fraught with difficulties. Nor is there anyway to predict which or how many of today's assumptions will be overthrown.

Communicability and difficulty, 3-7-93

Philosophy can be defined as that discipline in which we become so committed to a picture, to a point of view, to a particular method, to one way of looking at things, that we raise that to which we are committed to the status of an unshakeable absolute, to the status of that which is ultimate, the status of something which cannot be questioned, etc. In our day, we have accepted that commitment with respect to the

relevance and applicability of Fregean methods to the solution of philosophical problems, to the point that, where Fregean methods cannot apply, we judge that domain to be meaningless or at least unknowable.

Philosophers can even raise the method of textual analysis to that level, as so many of the so-called "Thomists" have done. You may say this is a bad example, because those Thomists are operating on faith. But my point is that our commitment to other methods, pictures, and or ways of defining questions and looking at things, is no less an act of faith than is the Thomist's. We may not operate on faith in the sense of taking another person at his word, but our commitment has no more rational basis. And perhaps it has less of a rational basis, since they know they are operating on faith, while other philosophers do not.

Short book and Putnam, 2-8-93

Notice that Hume's overthrow of metaphysics coincides precisely with his skeptical conclusions concerning empirical knowledge, and vice versa. Skepticism about empirical knowledge emerges from precisely the same critique that yields skepticism toward metaphysics. Since then, starting with Kant, we have tried to account for empirical knowledge while maintaining our metaphysical skepticism, and we have been unsuccessful over and over again. Maybe its time we saw that empirical knowledge needs metaphysics.

But if we return to metaphysics, we should do so with some new ground rules. E.g., we reject the common premise of rationalism and empiricism; we reject the linguistic theory of the a priori, e.g., only the axiom in Leibniz's proof that $2+2=4$ is a candidate for the self-evident, not the definitions. But the most important and controversial new ground rule will be that lack of common and long term agreement in metaphysics is not evidence for the invalidity of metaphysics. Also among the new ground rules will be the recognition that Hume and Kant were giving causal

explanations even while giving an account of causality that would rule out their own explanations. Another ground rule is that existence is not a mere positing or affirming, but is the basis for construction of metaphysical concepts.

Putnam, 1-31-93

He says the questions were first framed correctly in Kant. Kant took the focus off metaphysical questions and put them on questions about empirical, as opposed to metaphysical, knowledge. Where classical realism comes into the picture is that classical realistic metaphysics can provide the answer to questions about empirical knowledge that the deification of empirical knowledge precisely cannot provide.

The wild dogs of Africa are not dogs; they are related to jackals, not to wolves. Yet from the standpoint of "mental representations" they are much more like the ordinary dogs we are most familiar with than are chiuauas or pekinese.

Also, consider islanders who had seen whales and dolphins but no other sea creatures. They use the word "shif" for them. Then some of the islanders migrate to a place where other sea creatures are found. They use "shif" for all sea creatures. Would it make sense to tell them that the new sea creatures are not really shifs, or, after a long enough period of time, for them to go back to the original island and tell them that whales are not really shifs? And what if the original islanders also had a word for mammals, as opposed, say, to reptiles and birds and insects, etc., but use the word only for land mammals and would not have considered shifs, i.e., whales and dolphins, mammals, because their word "mammal" covered only land creatures? Would it make sense for them to learn that whales were not really shifs but mammals? Or would it make sense for the migrated islanders to learn that fish are not really shifs, because shifs are mammals?

xxxShort book, July 18, 1993

Title (of another book?): What every educated person should know about Aristotelian philosophy; or A second course in philosophy: the alternatives your first course did not tell you about.

Even though some sections will be very abstract, you should read them because they are necessary for understanding things, e.g., the nature of God, that you should understand even if you do not believe in them. You need to understand what you are opposed to to be opposed to it intelligently. E.g., you will find out that the question of whether we started with a big bang is not opposed to belief in a personal creator.

xxxMath, number, Trinity, June 29, 1993

There are four relations and three persons in the Trinity. This proves that number, discrete quantity, is not an accident in the sense of a mode of being inhering in a substance over and above what the substance is substantially. It is an "accident" in the sense of something extrinsic to the substance. Maybe number is transcendently identified with being the way truth and goodness are. That is, it is not itself a relation of reason but is being taken together with a relation of reason. That would be enough to save it from being a set of sets, etc. The Thomistic theory of transcendentals, as well as the Thomistic theory of universals, gives us other alternatives for the nature of numbers. The number of the persons are the persons taken as, taken as the extralogical terms of logical relations of identity with the objective concept person.

Adler-U, logic, math, 3-21-93

The chimps adding symbolically on television. How many times in doing my checkbook or taxes have I calculated correctly but performed the wrong operation for the value I needed to get, i.e., I added when I should have subtracted or vice versa. The point

is that the kind of knowledge required to know whether a value should be added or subtracted from another is of a different kind from the knowledge involved in knowing that a calculation is correct. The former kind of knowledge is reasoning, causal reasoning.

The opponent will say its just a more complicated algorithm, or a "higher-level" algorithm, from the algorithm for calculating, and calculating is also a kind of causal reasoning. But consider the example from the First of Michigan statement, where I couldn't figure out why the commission was added in one case and not in the other. The answer was that one case meant to show how much went back into my pocket, while the other case meant to show how much went out of my pocket; so the first case subtracted the commission, while the second case added it. Now this is not a matter of an arbitrary algorithm. Rather, the algorithm was designed because of the results desired and the nature of the steps needed to get that result. To show what went back into my pocket correctly, you cannot include the commission from the sale; to show what went out of my pocket, you must include the commission. These are necessities determined by the nature of the effect and of the means used to achieve the effect. The algorithm must reflect those natures; reasoning demands this. So it is reasoning; not just calculation. Calculation just deal with abstract causal relations, adding to and taking from, regardless of the natures underlying the quantities added and subtracted, the natures that determine which abstract causal relation is relevant in each case.

"Understanding" the abstract causal relations of adding to and taking from is different from understanding the natures that determine whether to get a result of a particular nature you must add or subtract a quantity of one nature from a quantity of another.

Modern theories of "what numbers are" are like Mercator projections of the earth. The success of a Mercator projection, the ability to correlate or "map" everything on earth to an element of the projection according to consistent and exact rules does not show that the earth is flat (Baker and Hacker, p. 357). Likewise, the fact that numbers can be "mapped" to theories of classes of classes or functions does not show that numbers are classes of classes or functions.

xxxShort book, 6-26-93

There are truths that do not seem to be verified by appeal to experience, e.g., truths of math and logic, truths like, if there is a good God, He cannot create evil. Rationalists, empiricists, and Kant all agree: truths not verified by appeal to experience are not derived from experience; experience is not the source of such truths. There must be another source. Experience cannot give rise to the knowledge of truths not verified by appeal to experience, knowably necessary truths.

The philosophy to which this line of thought leads us is a version of Aristotelianism, but with a different approach to two traditional issues associated with Aristotle: substance/accident and act/potency. Neither of these couplets consists of gnoseological values, as we have been taught. And the fact that we have been taught that is part of the problem or at least a symptom of the problem.

To do good philosophy for those of us with middle-of-the-road talent is immensely difficult. It takes extraordinary concentration and probably requires celibacy, not for moral or psychological reasons, but simply to give us the time for the concentration that is required.

To all first-year graduate students in philosophy, present, past, and future.

Graduate school gives us pride in our skills, gives us our positive self-image as professionally competent. Remember Ralph Martin: "Now I'm a philosopher!"

We are told that the alternative to linguistic analysis is phenomenology. De

facto, that is correct. But de jure there is another alternative whose adherents have done there best to hide from us.

"Philosophy's traditional function. You know 'I'll solve your conceptual problems for you'." Traditional? It goes back less than 100 years. It certainly does not go back to Frege. He only meant his logical studies to help solve problems in the philosophy of mathematics; he did not think of philosophy solely as conceptual analysis using the tools he developed.

Also, what conceptual problems? Conceptual problems you did not know you had. But I know you have them, because I dreamt them up. This makes philosophy a protection racket.

Short book, Putnam, Phil method, etc., 5-30-93

A letter to the first post-modern Philosopher, 5-30-93

Speculative philosophy: It should start from the following recognition that has been empirically verified by the history of philosophy. There is something about philosophic concepts that makes the following two things true. (1) It does no good to deny (a) that there is philosophical truth, ie., answers to philosophical questions and (b) that we are capable of knowing some philosophical truth, where "knowing" means certitude caused by awareness of sufficient evidence to exclude the opposite from truth, and "evidence" refers to objects of awareness that are public, capable of being shared by more than one person. And (2) it is highly unlikely that such knowledge, if and when it is achieved, will ever be shared by the majority of philosophers over a long period of time, more, say, than one generation.

As a result of the failure to achieve the opposite of (2), linguistic philosophers are denying (1). But the failure to achieve the opposite of (2) simply means that, after a century, the linguistic turn has had no successes, where success is measured by the original goal of the linguistic turn and of modern philosophy in

general, namely, to achieve the opposite of (2).

The conclusion to be drawn is the conclusion Aristotle drew: there is something different about philosophical concepts, not that there is no philosophical truth. But any theory of what it is that makes philosophical concepts different will, like Aristotle's theory, be subject to both (1) and (2). And all of this is empirically verified by the history of philosophy.

Notice that this does not mean that those lucky enough to discover and share knowledge of philosophical truth are more intelligent than other philosophers. It means the opposite. There is something different about philosophical concepts. And intelligence measures our ability to deal with "ordinary" concepts, concepts that lack whatever it is that makes philosophical concepts so different.

Notice also that I have been speaking of there being something different about philosophical concepts, rather than philosophical truths. It is correct that the meaning of concepts is their role in propositional truths. But in looking for the cause of philosophy's differences, we have to look at the cause of the difference of its truths. Since the concepts making up those truths are, by that fact, causal relative to those truths and relative to our knowledge of those truths, we have to look for differences in the concepts first. In fact, the theory that we should look at truths before concepts is one of the theories of the linguistic turn that has not produced any successes after a century.

XxxMaritain, Science and Rity, BORS in science, quantum physics, 4-20-93

M says that science can use math because quantity is the first accident of bodies, ie., that all their actions are quantitatively conditioned. But that is an ontological fact about a real accident of bodies. How can a real accident give rise to the use of beings of reason? The answer probably comes from the distinction

between law and theory. Real quantity is expressed at the level of law. In Reflexions, M talks about scientific laws expressing how one quantity varies with another. In other words, scientific laws directly concern real quantity as opposed to real causal relations directly expressed (see Salmon). But BORs come in at the level of theories explaining why one quantity varies with another. They come in because (1) the real natures, ie., causal dispositions of things are unknown; and (2) we need an explanation with quantitative assumptions in order to deduce the quantitative laws from it. Hence, we invent fictitious quantitative explanations. In other words, we do it because we need an explanation that is formally mathematical, because the material fact we are explaining is a quantitative fact.

Still, does this explain why we could not guess at the true explanation? Maybe we do not have to explain that; maybe the true explanation is just too far beyond us.

Concerning the interpretation of quantum physics that says it is unthinkable that things not be this way. The person who holds that owes us an explanation of how his scientific theory would have to be different if there were real velocity and position, only they cannot be measured at the same time because of physical causal relations.

xxxCause, 2-6-93

Citing the use of "cause" for things other than efficient causes in ordinary language is not to make the kind of argument "ordinary language" philosophers make. It is to cite a counterexample against the claim that only efficient causes should be considered causes. That is a sophisticated philosophical claim, one that assumes an argument having it as a necessary conclusion. And notice that this philosophical claim criticizing an ordinary use of "cause" amounts to the recognition that the subject of the change is not sufficient for the occurrence of the change, that what the subject is does not account for the change.

Cause, 1-9-93

Since what a change is is a relation of dependence, a change needs a cause sufficient for the change to be what it is.

Causal knowledge, 1-9-93

A contingent causal relation reveals no more about the nature of its term than that it can be the term of such a relation. What more do I learn about its nature when I learn that the relation is necessary? I learn that the nature is a material relation to the other term. That may not seem like much; but it is something very important.

Cause, 1-7-93

After writing Putnam. If C has no cause for occurring now rather than then, it has no cause; it is dependent and not dependent. S is a necessary condition for C, but not a necessary condition for C's occurring now as opposed to then. If C has no necessary condition for occurring now as opposed to then, C is caused and uncaused, because the only occurrence C has, the only one for which it requires necessary conditions, is its occurrence now. Its occurrence now is only logically distinct from its occurrence. Still the genus is only logically distinct from the species, and, as Garrigou-Lagrange said, a thing's generic cause can be distinct from its specific. Yes, but he did not say a thing needed no cause for its specific features.

What is a relation of dependence of a particular other is also a relation of dependence on some, perhaps more than one, other. The species logically includes the genus. If C is a dependency on what is other, what is other must be sufficient for C. If C is a dependency on the other, it is a dependency on the other for existence, not existence in this or that respect, but for existence. If some other is sufficient

for it in this or that respect but not for existence and there is nothing else on which C is dependent, C is a dependency for existence and not a dependency for existence, is caused and uncaused.

We are saying that C has a necessary condition in this respect but not some other respect. But these respects are not and cannot be really distinct. If it is a relation of dependence, there must be a thing or things sufficient to satisfy the relation of dependence. The dependence is that something other supply or be a necessary condition for its existence. But can it have a necessary condition for existence and not be dependent for existence, period? Can it be dependent for existence in this respect and not some other respect? Only if these respects are really distinct. And if they are really distinct, C is not a relation of dependence, but only has a relation of dependence, maybe not as an accident, but as a component. But then the other component is, not just has, a relation of dependence on the first component, because the other component cannot exist without the first. So another infinite regress is under way concerning this second component. It cannot just have a relation of dependence; it must be a relation of dependence. And so it cannot be dependent in this respect but not some other respects. Also existing and existing now are not really distinct; so it must have a cause for existing now.

Cause 12-22-92

A change, or a feature that comes into existence through change, including a continuous motion, is a relation of dependence on another; it depends on what is not itself for its existence. But if the subject of the change is the only cause, the change is not dependent for occurring at this point in the duration of the subject and not some other point. Occurring at point P in the duration of the subject may

appear to be an extrinsic denomination for the change. But the change is, by its identity with itself -- in fact, all that the change is -- is something happening to the subject; and all that the new feature is is something that the subject becomes and now is. The change makes the new feature to be what the subject is. So what is caused is the subject's acquisition of a new feature, and that acquisition is totally a relation of dependence. But the subject's acquisition of a new feature at point P in the subject's duration has no cause if the subject is the only cause. There has to be a cause for this change as opposed to that change; for this change is totally dependent, not just dependent in respect to this characteristic and independent with respect to that characteristic. But if the subject is the only cause, there is no cause for this change, i.e., for the subject's acquisition of a new feature at point P. For the only cause present is just as much a cause of the subject's acquiring the new feature at some other point; and the only thing present that could be what the change has for a cause can just as well not be what any change has for a cause.

YY

xxxEthics, birth control, sexuality, intrinsically evil acts, acts specified by objects, 3-17-93

We cannot use our person-making power outside of a context in which we leave the use of that power open to making persons. Nature may close the context so that persons cannot be made, but we cannot. This illustrates the sense in which we are responsible for our actions, not for their results. Or better, the sense in which ethics governs good or evil actions, regardless of results. The action in question is the act of the will. Just as it is against the goal of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to our own destruction, and to the cessation of our orientation to ends, it is against the nature of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to the preventing our person-making power from making

persons.

ethics, 12-10-92

example of the great mouthpiece using the rosary to deceive. There are two misvaluations here; deception is only one of them. Using a sacred symbol for deception is an evil even though no further harm is being done to the people being deceived.

XxxEthics, Sexuality, Contraception, 8/ 1/94

Contraception article: In contraception we willfully oppose (a la Grisez?) the value of our own existence; we devalue our own existence (and hence contradict ourselves a la Gewirth?). We do this because our existence is nothing but a product of sexuality. To prevent sexuality from producing human existence for the sake of some other value is to oppose the value of human existence, and hence to oppose our own value. It is to devalue human existence, and hence to devalue ourselves.

G and L, 5-30-93

If flouridation of water were found to produce infertility in two or 3 percent of the population, we can be sure that we would stop flouridating water. If there were a genetic condition that produced infertility, we can be sure that condition would be considered a genetic disorder, even a disease.

What if an artificial aphrodisiac were developed that dramatically increased the sexual pleasure of a certain percentage of the population, but the method of manufacturing it had the environmental side effect of producing infertility in two or three percent of the population? We would either find another way of manufacturing it or we would stop manufacturing it.

Ethics, 3-7-93

In belief there is an intrinsic relation to the goal of truth; that relation is intrinsic to what belief is. It can also be called an intrinsic relation to the goal of conformity with what things are; the goal of identity between what they are said to be and what they are. There is nothing mysterious about describing such a relation as intrinsic. It is just that a relation to that goal, an orientation to that goal sometimes occurs, and when it occurs, we call what occurs "belief."

Ethics and Abortion, 3-12-93

The theory of evaluating things to be or not be what they are may sound strange and unfamiliar, as if it were an ad hoc logical construct created to solve a problem but which had no relation to the facts. On the contrary, the most familiar thing we do when we make a moral judgment is to declare someone treated fairly or unfairly. And that is to treat them as if their interests were equal to yours or not equal to yours. But to judge that their interests are not equal to yours amounts to judging what they are not to be equal to you in whatever the crucial moral respect is. (Check the earlier "ethics" drafts; I think they develop this point somewhere. But start with the latest earlier draft and work backwards.)

The rational appetite evaluates things to be what they are as known by reason. As known by reason, things belong to kinds; they fall under universals. To evaluate as equal is to evaluate as being the same with respect to belonging to the same kind, ie., as both possessing feature X. X may admit of degrees within the kind, but it is the kind that counts. Now one kind could be those things with an IQ of 140, or 140 and above; another kind could be those things with reason. Which is pertinent to the goal of the rational appetite?

The rational appetite evaluates things to be agents oriented to ends, agents with interests. Specifically, to be agents oriented toward ends to be achieved by

making decisions based on "rational" knowledge, the same "kind" of knowledge you have. In doing so, I do not just evaluate them according to their proximate orientation to rational acts. Those asleep or in comas lack the proximate orientation to rational acts they I now possess. I evaluate them according to the underlying features that orients them to rational act: according to the most fundamental underlying features by reason of which they possess an orientation to rational acts. Here underlying means causally underlying. One cause necessary for rational acts is that I be made up, in part, of water. But water gives me no specific orientation toward rational acts rather than any other kind of act. The human genome, on the other hand orients me toward rational acts.

The human genome also orients me toward rational acts of a certain degree, since IQ is inherited, at least in part. So I am oriented toward rational acts falling within a certain range of intelligence. But I cannot be oriented toward acts of a certain degree of rationality unless I am oriented toward acts that possess rationality. The orientation toward rationality is causally more fundamental than the orientation toward a certain degree of rationality. What does this mean?

Rationality is the ability to grasp, be aware of, universal truths. Universal truths are not, e.g., that all figures on the blackboard are circles. Universal truths are truths linking universal kinds: water boils at such and such a degree; heat expands solids, etc.

People learn such truths with more or less ease, facility, speed, interest, (comprehension?). But one cannot have the ability to learn such truths with ease without having the ability to learn such truths somehow, with some degree of speed. My ability to learn such truths does not exist separately from the ability to learn such truths within a certain range of speed. But the ability to learn such truths can exist separately from the ability to learn them within a certain range of speed, while the converse cannot be true. So the ability to learn such truths causally

underlies degrees of rationality. So whatever features give me an orientation to know such truths, regardless of degree are the features relevant to the rational appetite's evaluation of me as an agent whose orientation to ends makes the achievement of my ends of equal value to the achievement of yours.

XxxEthics, Sex, SSR, Value of human life, birth control, 8/ 7/94

There is only one way to get a human being, through sex. If X is an absolute value, i.e., an end relative to which all other ends must be measured, then if we use the means to get X while deliberately frustrating X, are we not devaluing X? If other ends are in fact not measured to X, then X is not an absolute value. And those other ends are not measured relative to X, if we can frustrate X, while using the means to X to get them.

But if there were another way to get X, we could not say we were necessarily frustrating X. But what if an artificial means to X is developed, then there is another means to get X, and we are not choosing against X, when we practice birth control. But that assumes there are not other arguments that make those artificial means immoral to use. If they are immoral on other grounds, we are back at step 1.

xxxSSR, Sex, 9/19/94

If human happiness is found mostly in marriage, and if marriage is not going to work as well if we engage in premarital sex, isn't nature playing a cruel trick on us by giving us such compelling desires for extramarital sex? The question assumes that the desires are so compelling that we are almost forced to give into them and so diminish our chances for happiness. But if our desires seem to have that quality is it nature or society that gives them that quality, nature or nurture. Maybe reverse Rousseauism is true. It is not that the natural state would let us have free love. Rather the desire for free love is a corruption of society.

Ethics and SSR, September 15, 1993

Title: The Source of Society

Pornography, casual sex, etc., trivialize our person-making ability. They do it even though, e.g., the woman in the pornography is not fertile at the time. The features of her we are trivializing are the features by which we make persons, when we can make them, the features necessary for making children, when we can make them.

The brain is an instrument for thinking, even when we are sleeping. It still is what it is, because evolution selected it for thinking. The stomach is still an instrument for digesting, even when we are fasting. What the stomach is, its design, its nature, is an organ selected for digesting; etc.

SSR, G and L, 7-17-93

Contra the world's oldest theory.

Nature's strategy for the survival of offspring totally dependent on the care of others for years: the act that brings those offspring into existence creates a permanent relation between the parents. But that act works best to create a permanent relation among the parents, to support a permanent relation among the parents, when it takes place after the parents have made a permanent commitment to each other - or at least, when the act is the beginning of a permanent commitment. Since marriage does not work well if sex precedes it, nature's strategy must be for the act that produces offspring to initiate a permanent relation and take place in the contexts of initiating a permanent relation. Since the relation necessary for the care of the offspring does not work well if the act that produces offspring does not initiate. . . , is not used to initiate . . . , nature's strategy must be for the relation to work best when the act is used to initiate such a relation.

Why should nature's strategy not be that way? Why should sexuality not be

designed to, meant to, work best between two people who develop their preferences, expectations, etc., from each other, between two people who have not formed prior expectations? Why should it not be that way if nature designed it to support a permanent relation between people? If nature designed it to support a permanent relation by, among other things, the emotional effects of our early sexual experiences, then having those experiences outside of marriage can only weaken marriage.

More importantly, nature designed sex to support a relation that requires attitudes of commitment and love. But having sex outside of marriage, especially testing one another out, fosters the opposite attitudes to those necessary for the relation for which nature designed sex.

One part of nature's strategy for sex to support a permanent relation was to so design it that two people with no prior experience would be more likely to succeed in that relation if they postpone sex until that relation rather than try each other out before. Because of the opposite attitude problem. So it so designed sex that people who had not had premarital sex would be more likely to find each other compatible than those who had engaged in premarital sex. They would be more likely to find each other compatible than people who had tried out multiple partners before choosing one, because sex was designed so that two virgins could form their future expectations and preferences on the basis of the lasting psychological effects of the same early orgasmic experiences.

G and L, June 26, 1993

If there were a genetic condition that prevented someone from ever choosing to be a parent and have the kind of happy relationship with the other natural parent that would support them in bringing up the children together and sharing the joys and pain of parenthood -- if there were such a genetic condition, or if there is such a

condition, we would look for a genetic cure. We would be obligated to look for a cure. And if we found the correction, the parents would be obligated to use it.

Calling alcoholism a disease was supposed to reduce the associated social stigma. So why shouldn't calling homosexuality a disease have that effect. Or why do we do the opposite to reduce the social stigma of homosexuality.

Assume the author is a child-molesting, wife-beating, rapist. The question then is despite having so reprehensible an author, is the argument valid.

G and L and SSR, June 26, 1993

Sex education can no more be predicted to reduce the abuse of homosexuals than it has reduced the sexual harassment of women, even in the very schools and among the very children -- otherwise innocent children -- who are receiving the sex education. It can no more be expected to do that than our sexual liberalism has reduced rape, sexual abuse of children, or sexual harassment of women.

We do not experience sexual desire as a desire to procreate. But neither do we experience hunger as a desire for self-preservation, only as a desire or drive to remove a disturbing condition or produce a pleasurable condition instead. Think of how a baby experiences hunger; there is no thought of self-preservation in her head. And just as we can satiate a baby's hunger in harmful ways, even though those ways remove the disturbance or produce pleasure, we can satiate our sex drive in harmful ways, socially and personally harmful ways, even ways that are harmful by the standard of the preservation of the species, because they undermine the family that is necessary for the care of our totally dependent human offspring.

Children deserve to be brought up in an environment of a loving relationship between their natural parents, so that they learn without being told it, is that the meaning of their existence as persons is love between persons, the self-giving of one person to another. That is where their existence comes from. So they learn the

dignity of themselves and other human beings as persons, because persons are beings worth another person's giving their whole life to.

6-20-93

A gay couple's desire to be adoptive parents cannot have precedence over a gay adolescent's right to be able to choose to be a natural parent. There can only be adoptive parents if there are natural parents.

If there is to be sex education in schools, it cannot be morally neutral, as if extramarital sex were socially harmless. It should teach the social necessity of making marriage the norm for sexual behavior.

SSR, G and L, 6-13-93

We cannot think of children's rights solely in terms of those problems that can be solved by adversarial juridical procedures the decisions of which will be carried out by bureaucracies governed by administrative rules designed to achieve financial accountability. Nor in terms of those problems that can be solved by government. The first obligation we have to children is to minimize the need for all of the above. Instead, our society maximizes the need for it, and we let our society maximize the need for it.

Ma and Pa nature, Ma and Pa evolution got together to talk it over. How can we let evolution produce an infant as helpless as a human infant? How can we make sure human infants get the very long-term care they need? How can we make sure this doesn't happen only randomly by accident? Let's choose a biological method of reproduction that promotes the long term relation between the parents that the child needs.

6-6-93

Adoption is an acceptable alternative to the natural family in a society where the family is working. But if the family is not working, the adopting family will be no more stable than the natural family.

"Exploiting," in the pejorative sense, means taking advantage of something selfishly. But if our selfishness were enlightened, we would see that our problem is that we do not "exploit" sex sufficiently, i.e., that taking advantage of it for short term pleasure prevents us from "exploiting" it for the real contribution it can make to human happiness. Avail ourselves of, use, put to use, enlist into service, make the most of, turn to account, turn to one's advantage, use to advantage, reap the benefit of, profit by, capitalize on, cash in on, milk,

Practical philosophy: We need a theory of the level and scope of Hobbes's, Locke's, Rousseau's, Smith's, Mill's, Marx's, and Freud's, but a theory whose focus is how we can achieve success in committed personal relationships.

SSR, G and L, P and CG, 5-30-93 BIG

Children have the right to the training necessary for economic and social success. This is not principally technical training in a trade or profession but moral training in honesty, faithfulness to promises, teamwork, hard work, etc. But if they have a right to that kind of training they have even more right to the training necessary for success in marriage, since that success is more important to the happiness of the vast majority, necessary for society to fulfill the right of their children to a loving upbringing, and necessary for society to have morally educated members.

I realize that we are not used to thinking about things like the fact that we have more responsibility to our young and that they have the right to the conditions

necessary for a successful marriage.

It turns out that marriage works best, not when the partners try each other out, but when two virgins form their sexual habits, memories, and expectations together, that is, when your partner comes to mean what your sexual expectations and habits are.

One of the main reasons those who have premarital sex have less success in marriage is that they, by hypothesis, don't take marriage as seriously as those who refrain from sex before marriage, since, by hypothesis, those who think that they should refrain before marriage make the marriage state much more important than those who do not refrain. But why should a society want people to take marriage that seriously? For three reasons so crucial that they override any reasons to the contrary. (1) The happiness of the vast majority depends on success in marriage, and winking at sex outside of marriage makes success for those who choose marriage much more difficult, for the reasons spelled out in SSR. (2) Making the family work, which requires its being taken seriously in the way defined, is necessary to satisfy the right of children to be brought up in a loving environment, a right that takes precedence over the so-called right to free sex, because we have more responsibility to those who cannot defend their own rights than to those who can. (3) For society to work, its members must be morally educated, and the family is the only tolerably reliable method we have for that.

G and L, AA

In order for free speech to work, we have to allow good free speech to drive out the bad, i.e., for free speech to work good free speech, not government, must drive out the bad free speech. But that does not and cannot happen if we hold that good free speech does not have the right to drive out the bad, i.e., if we hold that it is a violation of rights for good free speech to drive out the bad.

5-26-93 AA BIG

My argument asks us to think in terms of categories and values that our society does not train us to think in terms of, that our society does not give a very high priority to, that have not been given a high place in our consciousness. For example, the idea that we have more responsibility toward the young because they cannot defend their own rights is not something we hear about on the evening news or on PBS very often. Nor is the idea of the sacredness of the right to choose to be a parent. Nor are the ideas that happiness for the vast majority depends on successful committed relationships and that the success of those relationships depends on social conditions, including the influences to which we are subjected in our youth.

Ethics, 3-24-93

Are there some actions that, by their nature, are necessarily contrary to a good higher than any good for the sake of which we might choose such actions? And are the "actions" in question the acts of choice or the "external" actions chosen? And is an external action bad because its choice would necessitate a violation of the finality of the rational appetite; or is an act of the rational appetite, a choice, contrary to the finality of the rational appetite because the external action is bad?

SSR, 3-17-93

Nature designed our sexuality in a way that would "ensure" that children would be taken care of in a loving environment. How? By designing sexuality so that it best operates in monogamous marriage, ie., by designing it so that, if it is used in monogamous marriage only, it provides a tremendous support for marriage, designing it so that it provides a tremendous support for monogamous marriage. As a result of the way nature designed it, couples who do not engage in premarital sex have more sexual satisfaction and generally happier marriages.

The last thing we think of in regard to the use of our sexuality, children, is the first thing nature thought of.

G and L, and SSR, 3-7-93

"The world's oldest theory" -- the theory that we will have happier marriages, that marriages will work out better, if the partners have premarital sex to see whether they are compatible.

Also, my relationship to one of my children is describable as "for better or worse, until death do us part." E.g., if a child develops a debilitating illness, the parent is responsible for caring for her. But my marriage partner is responsible for my having children, so she is responsible, along with me, for my having this life-long, for-better-or-worse relationship. The only just thing for marriage partners to do, therefore, is commit themselves to each other, to their mutual support in bringing up their children, in a life-long, for-better-or-worse relationship.

SSR, 2-24-93

Nature selected those features of our makeup most likely to ensure the continued reproduction of the race. The survival of the race depends on the long-term care of the children. The features that nature selected to ensure the long-term care of the children could have been distinct from the features by which the children were reproduced. E.g., we all could have an instinct to, or at least a strong inclination to, love and sacrifice for children, even if they are not our own children. Correspondingly, the feature by which we reproduce could be independent of love of any kind, including love of our partner or our children.

Nature did something different. First, it did not rely on instinct for reproduction and long-term care but on voluntary behavior. Therefore, it gave us very

strong inclinations to the behavior of reproduction and the commitment needed for long-term care. And it so designed the inclinations leading to reproduction that those same inclinations make the long-term care of the children more likely by supporting and making more likely a voluntary long-term relationship between the reproducing partners and a voluntary relationship of commitment to sacrifice for the children. The voluntary long-term relation between the partners that the design of nature supports is one of love and care between the partners, so that the children will have an harmonious, unfrighting environment, and so that they will learn from the example of their parents to give their children such an environment by living in harmony with their partners.

The inclinations leading to reproductive behavior can perform the function of leading to long-term care behavior with the other partner, if the inclination to reproductive behavior is used exclusively in a relationship with one partner, because those inclinations are designed to establish emotional and psychological bonds with those with whom we engage in reproductive behavior. Those bonds include, among many other things, expectations and preferences concerning the pleasure that comes from that behavior, which expectations and preferences are shared with your partner, if you have only one partner, but may not be shared with your partner, if you have had many others. These expectations and preferences are especially formed by your earliest sexual experiences and, therefore, with the partner(s) you have for your virginal experiences. The bonds also include memories shared with your earliest partners.

Therefore, the inclinations leading to reproductive behavior do not perform well the function nature gave them of leading to long-term care behavior, if they are used prior to the marriage commitment. And if they do not well support the long-term care commitment to the other partner, they do not well contribute what they can to our long-term happiness. For in designing us for voluntary, as opposed to instinctual,

long-term care behavior, nature selected a makeup such that the long-term commitment necessary for long-term care behavior was also necessary (normally) for our long-term personal happiness. If nature had not designed our makeup so that our happiness came from a long-term relationship, the long-term care behavior necessary for the survival of the species would have been much less likely, since that behavior must be voluntary.

Also, in selecting a species that relies on voluntary rather than instinctive behavior, nature selected a species whose members require the moral behavior of the others, the voluntary moral behavior of the others. Where do we learn morality and acquire the inclinations toward voluntary moral behavior? Nature could not solve that problem apart from its solution to the problem of long-term care for the children, because we develop those inclinations during or long-term development as children. So the acquired inclinations toward moral behavior come from the relationship that provides the long-term care needed for survival.

With this background, can we today say, as we implicitly do: nature screwed up? I.e., nature designed us to need monogamous sexuality but gave me all of these desires? No, those same desires are what can make monogamous relations work. What are we going to do instead, create a cabinet office for solving the problem of developing inclinations to moral behavior, as one set of problem among all the others parceled out among cabinet offices?

Possible title: Nature Screwed Up! or Did Nature Screw up?

Ethics, Animal rights, and assisting suicide, 2-19-93

Killing a person is worse than inflicting pain on her, while inflicting pain on an animal is worse than (painlessly) killing it. Why? The animal's act of self-awareness is an immanent action and, therefore, an action with an end in itself, and to the extent that animals perform immanent actions, animals attain ends in

themselves; animals have ends which are ends in themselves. And inflicting pain destroys a good which is an end in itself, and we are capable of knowing that it is an end in itself from our own awareness of what self-awareness is.

But an animal is not itself an end in itself, since it does not choose its own ends. A human being as such, not just in her actions, is an end in herself, since her nature is such that its ends will be the ends she gives it. So in killing a person we are destroying a being that is an end in itself, while in inflicting pain, we are only destroying the end of a being's action, a being that may not be an end in itself.

Our faculties of rational choice give us the end of evaluating things to be what they are, regardless of the choices they may have made; for they still are what they are after they make one choice rather than another. To assist another person in suicide would be to evaluate her as if she were not what she is, an end in herself. She remains an end in herself, even after choosing death as a means to her ends. So my decision to help her die would be destroying something that I must evaluate as an end in herself and so something I must evaluate as worthy of life, or else I violate the will's end of evaluating things to be what they are. To assist suicide would be winking at what I know her to be, would be pretending I do not know her to remain an end in herself.

Another way of putting it is that not every chosen end is worthy of our nature as ends in ourselves. And we are capable of knowing that suicide is not a worthy choice for her as an end in herself; so assisting her in accomplishing that choice would be treating her as if she were not an end in herself.

If we unnecessarily cause an animal pain, we are not respecting (evaluating) an activity that possesses its end within itself to be what it is, i.e., such an activity; we are not respecting it for what it is. Likewise, if we kill a person, we are not respecting a being that is an end in itself for being what it is; i.e.,

such a being. In declaring unnecessary pain (suffering) of any kind to be the essence of evil, Bentham was failing to evaluate the being to whom the suffering occurs as being an end in itself or not an end in itself; he was failing to evaluate the being, as opposed to an activity of the being, as the measure of good or evil. Even without making Aristotle's substance/accident distinction, we can distinguish the being, the agent with its nature, from the activity of the being, which activity exists to fulfill the end's of the being's nature, the ends that the being's nature is an orientation to. Still, if the activity is in some way an end in itself, we violate the end of the rational appetite if we do not evaluate the activity to be such.

SSR, 2-14-93

Nature designed sex so that the products of sex would be taken care of. Nature designed sex so that the instinctless and helpless children who result from sex would have the continuing care they need, and so that the parents could have the care they need when they are helpless in their old age. Nature did not foresee birth control, but it turns out that nature so designed sex that we cannot use it for temporary and immediate pleasure and to support the relationship that gives children the care they need.

Nor did nature foresee social welfare agencies.

SSR, 2-13-93

A "Dr. Lonnie Carton" broadcast this week, the 10th, 11, or 12th, on WBZ: Why Johnny Can't Tell Right from Wrong, by Fitzpatrick, a BC prof. Sounded good for backing me up on the family and the breakdown of ethics with plenty of statistics. She also referred to a Josephson (William?) who heads an institute she named having to do with ethics or morality (in its title) and who may be another source for statistics.

SSR, 1-31-93

In the Boston Globe, 1-31-93, pp. 65-66, James Alan Fox, author of a famous book predicting crime statistics on the basis of demographics, admits that demographics alone do not determine crime statistics. And he admits that the breakdown of the family plays an important part. But his remedies do not include supporting the family as a moral necessity for society. Instead, he bemoans the fact that underfunded schools have not made up for the lack of the family and calls for us to spend "an awful lot more money" as a remedy for the causes of crime.

So this is a perfect example of the social costs of not holding up the family as a moral necessity for society. And we can't afford that cost. Where is the extra money going to come from? From our medical budget or the money we spend on caring from old people (because there are not enough children to do it)? Sure, it is not logically necessary that we can't find the money. But on planet Earth, exploiting the relationships, emotional commitments, etc. that are based on sex is the only tolerably reliable way to do it. On Mars, emotions, relationships, and commitments may work some other way, but not on earth.

xxxG and L, 7/24/94 AA

To claim that cures don't work is to cynically lie to young G and L's for one's own selfish purposes. It is to deprive them of hope that is rightfully theirs for the sake of one's own selfish pleasure.

G and L, 3-17-93

Some, and maybe many, women become lesbians after marriage, according to Masters and Johnson in Sex and Human Loving, and maybe Kinsey also. Is this counter-evidence to my claim about early sexual experiences, if emotionally satisfying, having an influence of later sexual orientation?

G and L, 1-27-93

All the research can be done on one Saturday a.m. Get Master's and Johnson title. How big was their sample? How many bisexuals were included? Ask same questions for the following titles: Nicolisi's (check FCS Newsletter), the Crisis guy's, Lawrence Hatterer's. See if any of them make a reference to the longer one practices, the more difficult it is. Also check old Pastoral Renewals. Check follow up responses to M and J. Call BCS and EDS first.

We have a right to expect gays to stay the the closet for the same reason that we have the right to expect smokers not to smoke in public areas: doing so would be harmful to others; and in the case of open homosexuality, those harmed would include many who cannot defend their own rights. We have the right to expect that those who drink don't drive.

6-8-93

What to tell children about psychological abuse of gays: it makes it more difficult for them to successfully choose to be heterosexual, so those who practice the abuse are themselves responsible, in part, if a gay person is unable to have a heterosexual relationship. Why? Two reasons. Lack of self-confidence, i.e., the fear of not being able to have a heterosexual relation contributes to the gay person's inability. And they need security in relations with their own sex; lack of security in those relations contributes to their problem.

12/31/94

What if it were shown that early gay experience, and repeated experience, did not make it more difficult to adapt later? Still, the basic point is that premarital

experience of any kind makes it much more difficult to successfully choose the spousal-parental relation, which is a basic right of all young. If premarital sex makes that choice more difficult for straights, a fortiori it makes it more difficult for gays.

G and L, 6-18-93

M and J's failure to notice that extended gay experience makes changing more difficult would only show that those with much experience can change through therapy, which is the context in which M and J made their observations. But no one should have to go through expensive therapy to exercise their right to be parents. And what about all the gay parents who did not have to go through therapy, because they had limited or no gay experience.

Also, M and J had very small samples of the population which counts, ie., conversion patients instead of reversion patients. And their long-term follow up was a "statistical disaster."

Check the ages of their patients, if possible, and the means of selection relative to Kinsey's scale.

G and L, 2-28-93

There are serious arguments against hate crime legislation. The arguments against "hate crime" legislation need to be taken seriously. In the case of hate crimes against gays, at least, there is the same justification for legislation as there is for those provisions of federal civil rights legislation that permit prosecution for violations of civil rights: there are some, and perhaps many, jurisdictions where crimes motivated by hatred against blacks and gays will not receive adequate punishment. The need for that provision of the civil rights law is illustrated, for example, by the venue of the original Rodney King trial, which is an area where many

policemen and ex-policemen live. One of the jurors was even quoted as saying (check the quote about needing a lot of evidence "to convict a policeman").

And change "sponsors" to "advertisers."

G and L, 1-13-93

Parents, knowing what you now know, would you consider it just for someone to have passed a law when you were an adolescent the effect of which would have been to prevent you from being what you are now, a parent, or prevent you from having a happy relationship with the other parent so that you could bring up the children together? And knowing what you now know, would you consider it just for someone to pass a law the effect of which would be to prevent your adolescent child from having children of his own or from having a happy relationship with the other parent so that they could bring up the children together?

xxxC and D, 7/24/94

Title: Philosophy Under Control

XxxWomen's lib, ordination of women, March 20, 1994

Approach it this way: write an article entitled "How to Achieve the Ordination of Women". State that you are open to women's ordination if they can come up with good theological arguments, which they have so far failed to do. Political arguments, arguments about hidden intentions, etc., will not do. One can always do the right thing for the wrong intention.

xxxIntellectual fads, values, etc., October 18, 1993

Chesterton says someplace that England wanted the morals without the faith, or better, thought they could have the morals without the faith. But next it was: maybe we don't

need those morals. But after that came a loss of any standards, much less moral standards. We don't even have educational, intellectual, or artistic standards. Paintings by four-year olds still win awards. Silly articles in silly scholarly journals still are considered valuable contributions that count toward tenure, promotion, and salary increases. Etc., etc.

xxxTheology, anti-catholocism, July 30, 1993

God is serious about not consulting us. He did not consult us about using a screwed up institution sometimes run by evil men as his instrument of salvation.

xxxMiracles, 6-26-93

(1) Some effect occurs that cannot be produced by the natures of any of the things we know. (2) It is a greater effect, that is, the unknown nature can do what known natures do and more. What the unknown nature does in more by some understandable measure, e.g., it can do what the known nature does and more, e.g., can do it incredibly faster, by the standard of the speeds of known natures. (Somehow what is done, and hence the cause of what is done, is beyond the laws to which all the natures we know are subject. E.g., everything obeys gravity, is subject to gravity. To be able to walk on water is not just to do something different; it is to do something greater. (Why not say lesser? E.g., gee its too bad that you are not subject to gravity the way we are? Because Christ can do everything we who are subject to gravity can do, but at will can do more. (4) The natures we know are subject to it and hence subordinate to it. It can control the natures we know, i.e., it does things to and with the natures we know, but things beyond what any other natures we know can do, as already explained.

But how do we know this supernature is benign? Either we already know the

existence of God or we do not. If we do, miracles are only a sign of his special presence in, say, Jesus. If we do not, miracles may be a sign of the existence of a maker of things that we know (since they are subject to it), and if there is a maker of things, He is good, as metaphysical intuition knows and metaphysical argument can grasp.

Miracles, 3-22-93

In his lecture on ethics, Wittgenstein says when examined scientifically, the supposedly miraculous event loses its miraculous character and simply becomes a fact we have not yet explained scientifically, because we have hitherto failed to group the fact with others in a scientific system. But there are many facts not yet grouped with others in a scientific system that we do not consider miraculous. What is the difference? One difference is that unexplained scientific facts are often really laws, whereas miracles are singular events. On the other hand, each of the events adding up to a law is not considered miraculous individually. For example, each run of the Michelson-Morley experiment produces an anomaly; so we have a universal pattern that does not fit in with other natural laws. But neither does each individual run fit in with natural laws, but we do not consider those results, even individually, to be miraculous.

This negative result, while not showing what it is that characterizes the miraculous, at least shows that there is something that characterizes the miraculous that is other than merely being a fact that does not fit in with other scientific laws.

Faith, and P&CG, 2-19-93, BIG

Human reason is incapable of dealing with evil. For example, the constitution has two "religion" clauses to protect us against abuses like, for example, the

inquisition. It has a free speech clause for the same purpose. But now those very clauses are used, not just for evil purposes, but for the very evils they were meant to prevent. For example, teaching gay rights in schools attacks religious beliefs and so violates the no establishment clause, but the no establishment clause is used to prevent those whose religion is being attacked from defending their religion on an equal footing. For example, Camille Paglia calls "Stalinists" those feminists who want to use their right of free speech to influence sports magazines not to have swimsuit issues (ESPN, Sport Center, 2-16 or 17; 7 p.m.). In other words, the free speech clause protects against the right of free speech.

Though reason cannot cope with evil, there is nothing wrong with reason. Reason is meant to lead us to something greater than reason, just as sense knowledge leads to a higher kind of knowledge, and Egyptian surveying led to modern mathematics. Perhaps Godel shows this, or perhaps Godel as extended by Putnam in the last chapter of Representation and Reality shows this. There, P says that reason necessarily exceeds its own limits.

Faith, 1-24-93

How faith works: Before the practico-practical judgment (2) that it is good for me to believe that the apostles speak for God, there is the speculative judgment (1), based on miracles and other things, that it is unreasonable to believe that these men are not acting on behalf of God, or that God is not working through them, or some other such proposition. The important thing is that proposition (1) is not a matter of free choice. We cannot not know that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of it. Only after it, whatever it might be, does the question of a practico-practical judgment based on it come up. I can know the truth of the speculatively practical judgment corresponding to (2), just as the devil does not lack speculatively practical knowledge of the truth. What is free is just the practically practical knowledge.

xxx Liberal, Conservative, G and L, 5-30-93

Some conservatives think that the only ones who do not have medical insurance because they are young enough are "health insurance deadbeats."

What is a "social conservative"? If its someone who places what is traditional over individual rights, I am not a social conservative. If it is someone who places order over individual rights, I am not a social conservative. (Someone unconcerned about the environment, endangered species, gun control, capital punishment, defendants' rights, first amendment rights -- wholistically understood to include freedom of religion and no establishment, inclusively understood -- women's rights, discrimination by race, civil rights, etc.)

Conservative/Liberal, 3-24-93

Ideological liberals never believe that the governmental cure is worse than the disease; ideological conservatives never believe that the governmental cure is better than the disease. Ideological liberals always judge by the good intentions, abstracting from the facts; ideological conservatives always mistrust good intentions and ignore the good facts, i.e., the facts that support the liberal action.

Conservative/liberal, 2-14-93

C's create a false dichotomy when they argue that because social welfare agencies, or government in general, can't do X, Y, Z, e.g., can't do what the family can do or can't do things efficiently, that therefore social welfare agencies or government are bad. There is nothing wrong with social welfare agencies, just because we can't expect them to do what families can do. On the other hand, liberals are too optimistic about what social welfare agencies can do.

That recent Boston Herald op ed piece shows that conservatives really don't believe there is such a thing as racial prejudice. Rick Owens last night confirmed

this ("The Irish were discriminated against, but we made it!"). On the other hand, liberals don't believe there is such a thing as anti-religious, especially anti-Christian and anti-Catholic bigotry, when it goes on blatantly in the media and in public dialogue, e.g., by gays, everyday.

Teaching tolerance toward gays in the schools violates the intent of the no establishment clause. But, contrary to the conservatives, the mere intent of the founders is not the important thing. The important thing is the right not to have ones government establish a religion. This is a liberal dilemma, because the same liberals who want to use the schools attack Judaeo-Christian values concerning sex do not want school prayer, and argue against it on the basis of the no establishment clause.

Conservatives don't worry about the no establishment clause when it comes to prayer in schools; liberals don't worry about the no establishment clause when it comes to using the schools to attack Judaeo-Christian sexual morality.

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abstracting from the facts; ideological conservatives always mistrust good intentions and ignore the good facts, i.e., the facts that support the liberal action. Liberal/Conservative, January 14, 1994

Chris Hart says educational reform is held captive between the NEA, on one side, and right-wingers who don't want their tax dollars helping minorities, on the other. Liberal/Conservative, May 15, 1994

The president of Hillsdale college says that colleges and universities are in a crisis. What if congress held hearings on the crisis? Congress holds hearings precisely to identify problems solvable by spending money. If there isn't such a problem, there is not a problem relevant to congress. But the Hillsdale guy says government money is the problem.

Likewise, Reagan refused to admit the existence of problems, e.g., acid rain, if its existence would require government action to solve. If it would require government action, there is no such problem.

So different metaphysics refuse to admit the existence of different kinds of problems. How can we avoid these ideological blinders preventing us from seeing practical problems? (1) Recognize the necessity, the unavoidability, of metaphysics and religion, contra the liberals; (2) once recognized, separate that from our politics, contra the conservatives. (when their necessity is unrecognized, we are necessarily their slaves.)

xxx Trinity 4-23-93

Note taken during the discussion of Dick Hennesey's paper on transcendental quantity. Division by contradiction: this being is not that being. Division by relative opposition: this way of a thing's terminating a relation to itself is not that way.

But what is the cash value of speaking of stronger and weaker forms of opposition? Each form results from the use of negation, "This is not that."

Xxx UPS ordinati, 3-24-93

God's purpose in giving us the sacraments was not so that the Church could become a sacrament delivery system, was not so that the life of the Church would be that of an sacramental service institution, was not so that the celebration of the sacraments would be the most important thing for us to do whenever we gather, was not so that the priest's mission would be fulfilled mainly by exercising his sacramental powers, rather than providing the pastoral leadership and discernment necessary for the effectiveness of the sacraments.

UPS, ordinati, 3-4-93

There is nothing in this against the liturgy. But those priests and laity in a position to make decisions about the use of the liturgy, in a position to use the liturgy, do not understand what is necessary for its effectiveness. Nor do they understand how our misunderstanding of the pastoral role of the liturgy is an obstacle to its effectiveness. I.e., they do not understand how our focus on the presence of Christ in the liturgy, in an era when His presence within us is not understood, reinforces the ineffectiveness of using the liturgy at times when we could be learning about the presence of Christ within us and within the body.